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An Economic View of Innovation
and Property Right Protection
in the Expanded Regulatory State
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolving rights of private property are chameleon-like in charac-
ter: as forms of wealth and personal interest alter, so do property right
protections. From early protection of only traditional real property,
property right protections have grown to encompass government bene-
fits and licenses,' intellectual property,2 and, more recently, state creat-
ed regulatory interests.' This expansion has progressively eroded the
already battered right/privilege distinction which essentially denies
property interests in privileges.4 This Comment explores the questions
1. Governmentally created benefits, jobs, licenses, and income were hailed as the
.new property." See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964)
[hereinafter Reich]. Professor Reich points out that this new property is a product of
government largess, or wealth, and its ensuing relationship with the individual. Id.
For Professor Reich's elaboration on the premise of this celebrated article, see
Charles A. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966); Charles
A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965).
2. For an analysis of the increasing protection afforded to creators of intellectual
property through broadening tort and property considerations, see Wendy J. Gordon,
On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA.,
L. REV. 149 (1992).
3. See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896 cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993) (9th Cir. 1992). The Rasmussen court, interpreting
California state law, articulated the following standard to determine whether a proper-
ty right exists in an interest created by regulation: whether the interest is capable of
precise definition, of exclusive possession or control, and whether the putative owner
has established a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Id. at 902-03. See infra notes 119-30
and accompanying text (analyzing the Rasmussen opinion).
4. The right/privilege distinction prescribes that if a license is a right, the holder
may be entitled to a hearing before its revocation; if the license is a privilege, revo-
cation may occur without hearing or notice. Reich, supra note 1, at 740 (citing
GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 105-51 (1956)). Numer-
ous beneficiaries of government wealth have weakened this distinction by seeking to
transform their interests from privileges to rights. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 1439 (1968). The Rasmussen court eroded the right/privilege doctrine in a differ-
of whether and to what extent*newly created interests should expand
property right protections. It specifically examines intellectual innova-
tion utilized pursuant to a regulatory scheme,' concluding that in such
instances property protections should apply despite the fact that a
property interest in a government privilege is created.'
A new classification of property created by modern government is a
topic of heated debate with economic considerations at the core of the
dispute. Part II of this Comment examines the major cases that illus-
trate the historical development of property right protection.7 It dis-
cusses both the differing property interests that are now recognized as
well as the various actions emerging to protect them. Part III explains
and analyzes the classical economic argument generally favoring prop-
erty right expansion.' In addition to the perceived advantages of maxi-
mized individual and market efficiency, this section discusses the rami-
fications of failing to conform property rights with changing forms of
wealth and interest. Proposed limitations of property interests and
alienability are discussed in Part IV which concludes that, while these
arguments are valid in particularized instances, they are unable to pro-
vide a workable alternative to arguments favoring expansion.'
Because theories advocating expansion and theories advocating limi-
tation are useful in establishing and furthering the understanding of
property rights, Part V attempts to answer several unresolved questions.
First, are expanding property rights an economically necessary supple-
ment to newly created forms of wealth and interest? Second, are limita-
tions to property right establishment or alienability necessary to achieve
maximum resource allocation efficiency or to ensure that property
rights co-exist with other societal interests?"0 Against the backdrop of
potential expansion due to an increasingly regulated state, this section
presents the argument that economic efficiency is unattainable unless
ent manner. It recognized as property an interest issued to a particular individual that
entitles him to a specific privilege, without expressly transforming it into a right.
Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 901.
5. Rasmussen provides the example utilized in this Comment. In Rasmussen, an
airplane modification that allowed greater cargo capacity to DC-8 airplanes was
discovered. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 899. However, because of regulation by the
Federal Aviation Administration, the innovation could not be utilized absent approval
and certification. Id. at 898-99. Accordingly, Rasmussen's innovation was only usable
pursuant to a regulatory scheme.
6. The position advocated by this Comment is not that there exists a right to the
government privilege, but rather that once such a privilege is obtained it may not le-
gally be converted by third parties.
7. See infra notes 11-130 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 131-70 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 171-223 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
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property right protections can accommodate changes in what is valued
and profitable to society. Part V recognizes instances where some re-
strictions may be desired, but concludes that generally these restric-
tions are outside the realm of economic analysis and will not affect eco-
nomic efficiency. Finally, Part V presents a model that recognizes both
the economic goals and limitation concerns inherent in the ongoing
property right dilemma. This model assesses interests utilized pursuant
to a regulatory scheme and determines whether property right protec-
tion is appropriate.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Property is a nebulous legal principle without definite boundaries or
origins. Property does not derive from the Constitution, but is protected
by it." It is not created by the courts, but by "existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source, such as state law." 2
There are numerous and important considerations in the designation of
an interest as property, including justice, social function, and philoso-
phy.
3
Recognizing potential property classifications is not a new issue.
Rather, it is one that has escalated as perceptions of value and wealth,
the components of a profitable society, have evolved over time. By no
means has property accommodated all these changes. However, histori-
cally and modernly, scholars and legal commentators recognize that
protecting interests and preventing inefficiency cannot co-exist with
rigid property rights.'4 The current debate focuses on the lengths to
11. Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See also JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (Oxford University Press 1992) (asserting that an essential compo-
nent of constitutionalism is liberty; property rights are indicative of this in that they
are a means of limiting government power over individuals).
12. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) (quoting
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1992)). Property law
has developed largely from unexamined notions that divisions of property rights
should receive respect even though third parties often do not have an easy way to
discover these divisions. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and
Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 178
(1983).
13. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L REV. 1165
(1967).
14. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4 (conveniences, or creations
which courts will go in order to protect new interests and whether
there is a line beyond which property rights and efficiency do not nec-
essarily go hand in hand.
A. Early Property Right Issues
Early scholarly debates focused on the origin or source of property
law. One school of thought perceived property rights as "positive law,"
descending from the sovereign and his courts. 5 A second school of
thought believed that such rights arose from the traditions and common
customs of the community." The "positive law" position offered the
advantages of administrative ease and stability: uniformity and regulari-
ty in application that is binding beyond the immediate community. 7
Traditional property rights, recognized by advocates of the second posi-
tion, were habits and methods derived from property owners as a
group. These traditions are beneficial because they produce reduced
reliance on the legal system as well as increased efficiency stemming
from repeated transactions."8 Between these two positions, there was
often no clear advantage to either and no compelling reason why one
should prevail over the other. As with modem property rights debate,
each position presented unique benefits.
The impact of these early stances on modem property disputes is
evident despite the current economic emphasis.0 Because the legal
system assumes the predominate role in modem property rights alloca-
improving life, would not be devised unless the creator could keep them permanent-
ly); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 354 (1938) (the idea that rights
have value as property is almost identical with the notion that it may be turned into
money by selling it); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11, 12 (1972) (in
order for there to exist an efficient system of property, ownership of all resources,
except those so plentiful that all may consume as much as they desire, must occur).
15. Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom
and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85 (1992). For
theorists advocating property rights by sovereign descent, see JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832), reprinted in THE PROVINCE OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 5-6 (Legal Classics Libr. ed., 1984); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 312 (C.B.
MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
16. Epstein, supra note 15, at 85-86.
17. Epstein, supra note 15, at 86-87.
18. Id. at 86. See United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691, 714 (1832) (stating that
"there is [a] source of law in all governments, usage, custom, which is always pre-
sumed to have been adopted with the consent of those who may be affected by it").
See also First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096, 1103 (5th Cir.
1980) (stating that "law or custom may create property rights where none were
earlier thought to exist").
19. See infra notes 131-216 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 131-159 and accompanying text.
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tion, courts confront numerous potential individual interests including
customs and traditions arising within the community." The ensuing
body of case law has generally favored the establishment of property
rights."
Property rights jurisprudence was initially based upon constitutional
principles and protected only traditional property interests. In the nine-
teenth century, it was commonly held that "explicit expropriation" of
real property must be present before a compensable taking occurred.'
This was largely a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Transpor-
tation Co. v. Chicago,' which denied takings compensation absent
practical ouster of possession.' In Mugler v. Kansas," the Court
broadened this rationale, holding that a compensable taking did not
occur when a state acted under its police power to restrict the use to
which property could be put.' Similarly, in Pennoyer v. Neff,' the
Court protected traditional property interests. In Pennoyer, the Court
emphasized that in the event real property is taken without notice,
21. Customary practice in modern society is characterized by repeat and reciprocal
interactions between the same parties. Epstein, supra note 15, at 126. The establish-
ment of property rights through custom, though not prevalent, is still present in
recent opinions. See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1277-79 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(historical custom and usage creates a private property interest in presidential pa-
pers). Customary practices are also present in cases pertaining to news, intellectual
property, or transactions involving a transferable interest such as the government
privilege found in G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d
896, 902 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993). Cf. Stephen L. Carter,
Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevsky's Watch: Some Notes From the Intellectual
Property Front, 78 V. L REV. 129, 130-31 (1992) (emphasizing that while investigat-
ing custom has long been central to adjudicating disputes between private parties,
courts should not find this wholly decisive because customs may be inefficient or
interfere with broader state policies).
22. See infra notes 23-130 and accompanying text.
23. Michelman, supra note 13, at 1184. Governmental taking of property requires
"just compensation" to the rightful owner. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
25. Id. at 642. In Transportation Co., the city of Chicago built a tunnel under the
Chicago River. Id. at 635. The excavation temporarily denied plaintiff use of his dock
and required that he obtain the use of another dock. Id. at 636. The Court held that
the city's action did not require compensation. Id. at 645.
26. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
27. Id. at 668. In Pennoyer, a Kansas statute prevented the plaintiff from using his
property to produce alcoholic beverages. Id. at 624-25. The Court held that the prohi-
bition was within the sphere of the state's police power and did not warrant just
compensation. Id. at 668-69.
28. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
procedural due process protections may be invoked.' These cases typ-
ified the traditional property interest required in order to receive consti-
tutional protection in the nineteenth century. They also demonstrate
how the Court delayed expansion of property right protections with its
bright-line analysis of what constituted protected property.'
Largely because of the judicial emphasis on traditional property
rights, recognition of nonphysical property interests was extremely lim-
ited.' In 1918, however, the Supreme Court, in International News Ser-
vice v. Associated Press (INS),' set forth. a position generally favoring
creation of property interests beyond tangible real property:
If that which the complainant has acquired fairly at substantial cost may be sold
fairly at substantial profit, a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purpose
of disposing of it to his own profit and to the disadvantage of complainant cannot
be heard to say that it is too fugitive or evanescent to be regarded as property.?
The INS Court enjoined duplication of other news agencies' "fresh" sto-
ries, yet further provided the tort of misappropriation an enforcement
mechanism.' INS is therefore important in two ways: first, it established
a property right in information-a nonphysical or intangible entity; and
second, it created a tort that would provide the impetus for future intel-
lectual property expansion.' As the reach of misappropriation and simi-
lar torts has expanded, it has become more difficult for a third party to
convert or unfairly profit from another's creation or idea. Accordingly,
the INS holding is consistent with policy considerations that reward
29. Id. at 741-43. The Court held that the Due Process Clause protected property
located within a state even where the owner of such property was not a resident of
the state in which the property was located. Id. at 743.' The Due Process Clause
provides that there will be no denial of property without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. Later interpretations of substantive protections proscribed addi-
tional government interference and also provided protections to intangible rights, such
as government benefits. See Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme
Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CAL. L. REV. 146, 148 (1983). See also irfra
notes 108-118 and accompanying text.
30. For a thorough analysis of the origin and early jurisprudence of property law,
see generally Scott Coval, et al., The Foundations of Property and Property Law, 45
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 457 (1986).
31. The Supreme Court did recognize the existence of property rights in intangible
items pursuant to the patent system. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1829)
(holding that although patent interests are valid, petitioner's was not because he
marketed it before he applied for the patent).
32. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
33. Id. at 240.
34. Id. at 242.
35. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy
of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411 (1983) (de-
tailing the INSs role in the expanding tort and property actions protecting intangible
interests).
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creativity inasmuch as it protects the owner with some form of owner-
ship.
B. Federal Preemption
Although INS indicated that breakthroughs in the rigid classification of
property were imminent, fifty years passed before a steady trend recog-
nizing new property rights developed. Federal preemption proved to be a
major obstacle by preventing states from thoroughly protecting newly
created interests.' In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 7 the Supreme
Court held that a state may not provide protection beyond what federal
patent and copyright provisions allow.' Strict preemption analysis was
the response to state unfair competition law. The rationale was that state
protection of interests representing too slight an advance to be patented
would monopolize something that federal law considers belonging to the
public.'
The surge of property expansion could not begin until courts relaxed
their rigid stance regarding preemption.' This began with Goldstein v.
California,"' where the Supreme Court held that the Copyright Clause42
36. Preemption occurs when Congress explicitly preempts state law, when a feder-
al scheme occupies a given field, thereby preempting state law in that field, or when
compliance with both federal and state law is impossible. G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs.
v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing California v.
ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993)).
37. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
38. Id. at 232-33. Sears held that federal patent laws preempted a state law prohib-
iting the imitation of unpatented lamps. Id. at 233. The Court referred to James
Madison's statement that states "cannot separately make effectual provision for either
patents or copyrights." Id. at 228 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 43 'at 288 (Cook ed.
1961)). See also Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38
(1964) (preempting state law preventing the imitation of unpatented light fixtures).
39. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32.
40. Early decisions excluded state protection that went beyond federal provisions.
More recent decisions allow state protection that goes beyond protection afforded by
federal laws provided there is no conflict with the federal laws. Compare Sears, 376
U.S. at 229 (state law infringing on the "area" of federal statutes must be set aside)
with Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) (states
may place limited regulations on unpatented innovation but may not "impermissibly
interfere with the federal patent scheme").
41. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
42. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution secures "for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries .
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
did not preempt a criminal provision prohibiting piracy of vocal record-
ings.' The Court stressed that the Copyright Clause could not be con-
strued to vest the federal government with all-encompassing power to
provide copyright protection." Thus, California's criminal provision,
though beyond federal protection, was not unconstitutional.' Similarly,
in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,' the Court held that an Ohio trade
secret law47 was not in conflict with federal patent protection even
though such interests would not be eligible for patent protection.4 Pre-
emption, however, remains an obstacle for states as Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.' indicates. The Bonito Boats Court held that
state regulation of intellectual property must yield where inconsistent
with the federal patent scheme's balance between public right and pri-
vate monopoly which was designed to promote creative activity.wo
Kewanee Oil and Bonito Boats, though reaching different results, actual-
ly are not in conflict. Rather, they serve as examples of the change in
preemption interpretation. State provisions may now protect interests left
unattended by federal provisions provided an actual conflict with federal
provisions does not exist."1 This allows the policy of rewarding creators
while preventing unjust enrichment to outweigh allowances of copying to
serve the public demand.'
As presumption standards became judicially relaxed, "property" ex-
panded to include the intangible areas of intellectual property such as
43. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571. The criminal provision in question provided that
every person is guilty of a misdemeanor that knowingly transfers any sound recorded
on a phonograph record with intent to sell. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(a)(2) (West
1972).
44. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 553. To emphasize the type of changes modem causes
of action have brought in a similar scenario, see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing a tort-based cause of action to a California recording
artist whose voice was imitated in a commercial).
45. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571.
46. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
47. The Ohio statute at issue provided protection to any "formula, pattern, device,
or compilation of information . . . which gives . . . an opportunity to obtain an ad-
vantage over competitors." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.51(C) (Supp. 1973).
48. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493. The Court reasoned that the federal patent law
policy of encouraging invention was not disturbed by the existence of another form
of incentive to invent, such as trade secret protection. Id. at 482-83. In this respect,
the two systems were not in conflict. Id.
49. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
50. Id. at 167. In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court held that a Florida law forbid-
ding duplication of unpatented boat hull designs was preempted. Id. at 168. The
Court stated that the statute conflicts with the "strong federal policy favoring free
competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection." Id. (citing Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969)).
51. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 482-83.
52. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 151.
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art, design, ideas, and information.' Thereafter, numerous protections
evolved from private causes of action to heightened patent and copyright
provisions. Broadened constitutional protection against government
deprivation buttressed the expanding definition of property.' Modernly,
both of these areas become less separate, as evidenced by government
interests permitting the use of intangible intellectual property.M
C. Intellectual Property
Fairness to intellectual property creators combined with changes in
the forms of wealth, caused by the dramatic growth of high-tech indus-
tries, is thought to have fueled the intellectual property expansion that
later followed INSs initial protection of an intangible interest." This
growth originated from two markedly different sources: federal statutory
protection and state law. Federal protection of intellectual property is
found in patent, copyright, and trademark statutes. State protection
evolved as state courts and federal courts interpreting state law substan-
53. Id.
54. Misappropriation and unust enrichment theories are the primary sources of
protection in state courts. Id. at 152-56. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
55. See Simon, supra note 29, at 149. See also infra notes 95-118 and accompany-
ing text.
56. See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 902
(9th Cir. 1992) (permitting the use of an airplane modification pursuant to a regu-
latory permit), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
57. Gordon, supra note 2, at 156-57. Intellectual property expansion has been
rapid, ranging from judicial protections to legislative changes. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302-305 (1988). In the trademark protection area, the "increased importance of
symbolic identification in an age of visually oriented consumers" has contributed to
expansion. Edmund W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 78 VA. L.
REV. 293, 294 (1992).
58. The 1952 Patent Act governs patent law. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103 (1988). The Act
protects new ideas or principles not yet known, allowing applicants to secure exclu-
sive grants from the government to make, use, or sell an invention. Patents are valid
for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The 1909 Copyright Act provided for protection
of literary property if notice was posted before a work's publication. Currently, the
1976 Copyright Act provides applicable copyright provisions without the notice re-
quirement. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988). Copyrighted works are secure until 50 years
after the author's death. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (1988). Trademark rights protect any
word, name, symbol, or device distinguishing goods and last for 20 years, with the
possibility of renewal. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (1988). The Trademark Act of 1946,
also known as the Lanham Act, protects against false advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(1988).
tially expanded intellectual property protections through tort and prop-
erty actions.'
1. Federal Statutory Protection
Federal property right statutes granting protection through patent,
copyright, or trademark are not of recent origin.' In patent law, the clas-
sic theory advocating protection is the "reward" theory," which com-
pensates creators for risks and expenses incurred. Copyright and trade-
mark protections are partially premised on unjust enrichment, such as
the belief that one should not reap where another has sown.' As with
expanding state tort and property actions resulting from a diminished
adherence to federal preemption, recent judicial interpretation of federal
statutes also indicates a broadened recognition of what constitutes prop-
erty.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,' the Court held patentable the discovery
of a new bacterium.' Yet 32 years earlier in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co.,' the Court'held that an innovative combination of
rhizobia bacteria was not patentable.' Logically, an intellectual creation
59. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 58. For an economic perspective of patent law, see Robert P.
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Inno-
vation, 76 CAL L. REV. 803 (1988). For trademark analysis, see William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcON.
265 (1987). For the history of copyright protections, see Howard B. Abrahams, The
Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common
Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L REV. 1119 (1983). Although statutes affording these
protections are well established, recent interpretation has expanded their reach in
certain instances. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertis-
ing Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Some Puzzles in the Law of Deception,
78 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1992) (asserting that the 43(a) cause of action has broadened,
giving businesses greater ability to protect themselves against competitor advertising).
See also Kitch, supra note 57, at 294 (stating that current relaxation of the standards
of patent validity has made enforcement of patent ights easier).
61. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF POLmcAL EcONOMY, reprinted in 2 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENrHAM 212-13 (John Bowring ed., 1962). The debated issue of
the reward theory was whether the compensation should be in the form of payments
or an exclusive privilege that protects against imitators. Id. For a discussion of a
remarkable damage award based on patent infringement, see Polaroid Corp. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (awarding nearly one billion dollars
to Polaroid for patent infringement).
62. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 156.
63. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
64. Id. at 313.
65. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
66. Id. at 130-31. The Court reasoned that a patent could not be based on product
traits that are "the work of nature"; rather there must be more of an inventive ele-
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should be more patentable than a new organism, which is essentially a
discovery of nature.7 The inconsistency of these decisions is largely at-
tributable to the expansion of intellectual property from 1948 to 1980 and
the Court's changing response to this expansion. In San Francisco Arts
and Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee,' the Court upheld a
statutory trademark property right in the word "Olympic," which had
commercial and promotional value resulting from the United States
Olympic Committee's expenses and efforts.' Similarly, a broadened in-
terpretation of federal copyright law is illustrated in West Publishing Co.
v. Mead Data Central." In West Publishing Co., the Eighth Circuit af-
finned a preliminary injunction barring Lexis, a Mead service, from cross-
citing page numbers from West, a competing legal service.7'
The expansion of property rights based on federal law, however, is
much less dramatic than that based on state law and, in some instances,
case law appears to check the expansion. In Parker v. Flook,' 2 the Su-
preme Court affirmed the rationale of Gottschalk v. Benson," holding
unpatentable an equation by which new values are combined with old to
yield updated results.74 In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,' the Court held that a telephone company could not copyright the
white pages of its directory.' This holding placed a limit on the ability
to copyright information-specifically noncreative factual compilations."
ment to the product. Id.
67. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA.
L REV. 305, 305-06 (1992). See also STEPHEN A. BENT ET AL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE (1987) (applying traditional concepts of patent
law to biotechnological subject matter).
68. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
69. Id. at 523.
70. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
71. Id. at 1222. The Court held that West's layout of page numbers was part of its
overall "arrangement," which the court believed took enough "labor, talent, and judg-
ment" to warrant copy protection. Id. at 1226-27.
72. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
73. 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (disallowing patent protection for an algorithm that convert-
ed binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers).
74. This situation is analogous to the bacteria scenario held patentable in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). However, in this instance, the Court declined to
expand the scope of patentable material when presented with an opportunity to do
so. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
75. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). See also Triangle Publications v. Knight Ridder Newspa-
pers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing publication of copyrighted material by a
competitor for comparison purposes).
76. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297.
77. Id. at -1290. Despite limiting copyright protection based on lack of originality in
Although not halting the flow of property expansion, these cases indicate
a waning of federal property right expansion and emphasize the notion
that state courts are the arena in which new property rights will be liti-
gated.7
2. State Protection
State law provides the basis for most private causes of action that
seek to protect intellectual property.' Through numerous doctrines, in-
cluding misappropriation, dilution, unjust enrichment, and conversion,
both state and federal courts interpreting state law have circumvented
preemption problems and rewarded innovators tort and property rights
for their creations: This is partially because federal law often defines the
right but provides no mechanism of private enforcement.' In Cort v.
Ash,"1 the Supreme Court limited the common-law doctrine that viola-
tion of a statute entitled the injured party to redress his grievances
through a private suit in federal court. The Court held that an implicit
private remedy cannot be maintained if the statute does not expressly
provide for one.' Thus, state law should provide redress to the injured
party. The Court's favoring of state law causes of action combined with
the more lenient preemption interpretation led to vast state expansion of
intellectual property.
factual information, Feist could actually have the end result of expanding property
rights. Pursuant to Feist, this information is now outside the zone of federal protec-
tion, thereby enabling states to circumvent preemption and potentially include such
information in its state-protected property categories. Gordon, supra note 2, at 155-56
n.21. The Court might reach a different result in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data
Central, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) if it were
decided today, because page numbers are facts, not creative thought. Gordon, supra
note 2, at 274 n.471.
78. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), discussed infra notes 81-82 and accompa-
nying text.
79. See supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text. The emergence of private causes
of action in state forums arose because of state law's classification of property,
which provided protection beyond that of federal law.
80. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text; G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v.
Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is
no implied private right of action un the Federal Aviation Act), cert. denied, 113 S.
CL 2927 (1993).
81. 422 U.S. 66 (1974).
82. Id. at 78. The respondent in Cort alleged that a private claim for relief existed
under 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1988), which prohibited corporations from making contribu-
tions or expenditures in connection with specified federal elections. Id. at 68. The
Court held that a federal enforcement action may arise if. the person seeking en-
forcement was one the statute was primarily designed to protect; if legislative intent
and the underlying purpose of the legislation indicated that such a right existed; and
if the area was not already relegated to state law enforcement. Id. at 78.
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In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,' the Supreme
Court cited both incentive to creators and the need to deny unjust en-
richment as justification for applying state law granting property protec-
tion against the unauthorized broadcast of a human cannonball act.'
Carpenter v. United States' extended the rationale of INS to protect
information confidentially acquired by a newspaper or its reporters.' In
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 7 the Ninth Circuit granted a recording artist
the right to prevent commercial imitation of her voice.' In City of Oak-
land v. Oakland Raiders,' the California Supreme Court held that de-
spite being an intangible interest, a property right exists in a football
franchise and is potentially subject to state eminent domain laws? In
Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co.,9 the Illinois Court of
Appeals held that Dow Jones, under a misappropriation theory, was enti-
tled to forbid use of its average as a reference point in a futures trading
contract. This holding was reached despite the fact that Dow had no
direct competition in this case because it did not use its average in such
a manner.9
83. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
84. Id. at 573-77.
85. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
86. Id. at 25. The Court held that a reporter's use of pre-publication information
for personal profit violated mail and wire fraud statutes. Id. at 24. Preliminarily,
however, the Court recognized a property interest in the information. Id. at 25.
87. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 463-64.
89. 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
90. Id. at 845. By granting a property right in the intangible subject, the Oakland
Raiders football franchise, there was the potential for the Court to find a public use
of the franchise, thus restricting the owner's property rights by denying him the right
to relocate the franchise.
91. 456 N.E.2d 84 (111. 1983). Professor Gordon notes that splits among the circuits
indicate the volatility in the area of state property protection law. Gordon, supra
note 2, at 153 n.18. Compare Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap and
Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant's sale of team emblems
could violate trademark laws even without a showing of consumer confusion about
the source of the items), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) with Int'l Order of Job's
Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980) (confusion of source
or origin should be a prerequisite to plaintiffs suit), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 941 (1981).
See also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L REV. 397, 398-99 (1990) (courts commonly
base trademark protection on impairment of the mark's value, rather than consumer
confusion).
92. Dow Jones, 456 N.E.2d at 90.
The expansion of state law property right protections has been wide-
spread, resulting as much from the desire to protect new interests emerg-
ing in society as from preservation of the reap/sow principle.' In addi-
tion, commentators contend that state intellectual property expansion is
the result of scarcity of resources. Despite the emergence of new inter-
ests, the number of potential users may exceed the number of inter-
ests.' In this situation, property rights become increasingly necessary to
ensure efficient allocation and management of the limited resource. Be-
cause so many factors affect property determinations it is unlikely that
any one model is precisely correct. Rather, they all contribute to the
broadened state protections available today.
D. Constitutional Protections
Recent interpretations of mandatory government compensation of a
rightful owner of a property interest also have contributed to heightened
property right protection.' Constitutional property rights are based on
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which state respectively, that the
government must justly compensate a private property owner whose
property is seized for public use' and that there will be no denial of
property without due process of law. 7 Constitutionally protected
property generally falls into one of two categories: a pre-existing proper-
ty interest taken or converted to public use or a governmentally created
interest bestowed and subsequently withdrawn. In the first instance, the
issue involves the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment; in the second,
it involves Fourteenth Amendment Due Process property protections.
1. Fifth Amendment Takings
Early takings cases held that direct appropriation of real property must
occur before triggering constitutional protections,' but this evolved into
93. See Gordon; supra note 2, at 156-57 (discussing the nature and underlying
policy of this principle).
94. Kitch, supra note 57, at 295 (citing Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in
the Realignment of Common Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990)).
Under the rationale of property expansion, the result is an attempt to close off the
amount of available information, thus shrinking the public domain. Id. at 295.
95. See generally Simon, supra note 29; Reich, supra note 1; Michelman, supra
note 13.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
makes this applicable to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This provision is utilized in instances where protected
government benefits are denied.
98. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992). See also
Lawrence Blume and Daniel L Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
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protection against both excessive regulation' and physical invasion."
The scope of compensable property in takings instances is further ex-
panding. For instance, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,"0 ' the Court declared that a per se taking exists when the govern-
ment authorizes any permanent physical invasion of property. 2 In
Loretto, a New York law required that a landlord permit a cable televi-
sion company to install its cable facilities upon his property." The
Analysis, 72 CAL L Rev. 569, 569 (1984).
99. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, regulation that goes too far becomes a taking).
This broadened the holding of the landmark case United States v. Gettysburg Railroad
Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). Gettysburg set forth the position that would serve as the
backbone of takings analysis: just compensation is required in all takings, regardless
of the weight of the public interest. Id. at 679. Regulatory actions, however, are not
deemed takings where the pre-taking owner's uses of the property were harmful or
noxious to the public. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2901 (1992) (defining harmful or noxious uses as those that are proscribed by exist-
ing rules or understandings).
100. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (asserting that the taking
of a landowner's interest may result from physical invasion of the air above his prop-
erty). Widely divergent methods of determining when a taking occurred resulted in
some confusion. Compare Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962)
(airplanes must physically violate airspace above property before a taking can be
found), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), with Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d
540, 546 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965) (actual physical overflights
are not necessary for recovery). Consequently, commentators have proposed numer-
ous models to deal with this uncertainty in the area of takings. See generally Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85' HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (proposing a method called
the "cheapest cost avoider," which justifies compensation for takings in instances
where the transaction cost is less than the savings resulting from the exchange);
Michelman, supra note 13, at 1222-26 (proposing a utility analysis measuring takings
by various factors and then justifying takings in instances when they are fair); Joseph
L Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 166-69 (1971)
(proposing a non-compensable "spillover" result when government's use of one land
spills over and limits the use of another); Joseph L Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 54-58 (1964) (suggesting two types of government takings:
first, a compensable enterprise action arising from government's participation in eco-
nomic society; and, second, a non-compensable action, arising from the government's
necessary allowance of only one of two conflicting private land uses). For an ac-
count of the different models proposed to deal with the uncertainty in this area, see
Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165,
166-95 (1974).
101. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
102. Id. at 426.
103. Id. at 423 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)).
Court held that this invasion entitled the property owner to compensa-
tion despite taking up only one-and-one-half cubic feet of the proper-
ty."° In Nixon v. United States," the D.C. Circuit held that a per se
taking of personal property for Fifth Amendment purposes may exist."
In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that presidential papers
are personal property by virtue of the history, custom, and usage of such
papers. 1
07
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs sum-
mary termination of government created and disbursed wealth or bene-
fits."° Government largess, or revenue, is distributed to citizens in a myri-
ad of ways, including entitlements, benefits, jobs, and licenses." In a
pair of 1972 cases, the Supreme Court announced the criteria to deter-
mine which forms of government largess constitute property. In Board of
Regents v. Roth. and Perry v. Sinderman,"' the Court announced
that state law will serve as the determinant upon which property deci-
sions are based."2 Thus, states may determine which substantive inter-
104. Id. at 43841. Although the Court expressed no opinion regarding the amount
of damages due, the taking was premised on the space taken, damage resulting from
the installation, and potential costs of repairs and upkeep. Id. at 440, n.19. Moreover,
the Court pointed out that its holding was very narrow, justifying findings of per se
taking only in instances where permanent physical invasion occurs. Id. at 441. See
also Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1992) (announcing that a rent
control ordinance does not constitute a taking because it does not compel an owner
to suffer physical occupation of his property); Federal Communications Comm'n v.
Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1987) (holding that a taking did not occur
where a tenant invited to stay at one rent remains at a lower regulated rent). These
cases illustrate the narrow holding of Loretta, that is, that the per se takings doctrine
does not extend to regulatory takings.
105. 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
106. Id. at 1285. See generally, John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings:
A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1987). If the Su-
preme Court fails to grant certiorari to or affirms Nixon, the ramifications from a
property classification standpoint will be that the system of property allocation based
on tradition and custom is still a viable means of property recognition and that a per
se taking of personal property is recognized.
107. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1276-77.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
109. See JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.5 (4th
ed. 1991).
110. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
111. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
112. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 n.7. For a discussion of the
implications of Roth and Perry to takings analysis, see generally Simon, supra note
29.
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ests are also property interests, however, federal courts will govern the
due process proceedings required upon termination of the benefits."3
In Arnett v. Kennedy,"' the Supreme Court questioned, but did not
overrule, the Roth-Perry approach. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plu-
rality,"5 found that a difference exists between discretionary and
nondiscretionary benefits, with procedural due process afforded only to
the latter."' Legislative procedure, however, could protect discretionary
benefits. In Arnett, legislative protection was available but was condi-
tioned upon specific procedures to determine cause for federal employee
dismissal. Thus, when a government employee was fired for making pub-
lic statements accusing his supervisor of bribery, he was bound by the
procedures set forth in the statute that granted his property interest in
the first place."7 Despite Justice Rehnquist's misgivings, and consistent
with the Roth/Perry approach, governmentally derived wealth rapidly
became an accepted form of property, with revocation of most benefits
invoking procedural safeguards."8
These constitutionally based decisions are important because as prop-
erty interests for purposes of just compensation and due process broad-
en, the interests potentially reached by private state actions likewise
broaden. As with the private evolution of state property rights, this ex-
pansion is indicative of the changing forms of wealth and value in soci-
ety.
E. G.S. Rasmussen & Associates v. Kalitta Flying Service, Inc.
In G.S. Rasmussen & Associates v. Kalitta Flying Service, Inc., the
113. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602-03. Thus, whether unrenewed contracts of state universi-
ty professors were unconstitutional deprivations of property turned on whether their
expectations were sufficiently grounded in state law, and, if so, whether proper Four-
teenth Amendment procedural protections were provided. Simon, supra note 29, at
151-53.
114. 416 U.S. 134, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
115. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stewart joined in the plurality opinion.
Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred and dissented in part. Justice White wrote a
separated concurring and dissenting opinion. Id.
116. Simon, supra note 29, at 155.
117. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 137, 152-55.
118. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (finding a property right in food
stamps); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985) (holding
that a property right of a school district employee was violated when no pre-termina-
tion opportunity to respond was provided).
119. 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
court squarely faced the product of the expanded regulatory state: prop-
erty right protection issues regarding intellectual design as well as value
derived from government regulation permitting the use of the design.2 '
Based on his innovation, Rasmussen obtained from the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), which es-
sentially certifies changes to existing aircraft design."2' Kalitta Flying
Service subsequently copied the certification number of Rasmussen's
design, modified its own planes accordingly, and neither applied to the
FAA for its own privilege nor compensated Rasmussen.'22 Judge
Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, found a property interest in the
design and accompanying privilege by specifically looking to California's
statutory scheme as well as case law."n Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Kalitta's actions amounted to the conversion of an in-
terest that belonged solely to Rasmussen.'24
The court in Rasmussen could have rested its property determination
on one of two bases: intellectual design or governmental regulatory inter-
est."n Rasmussen's legal arguments were more firmly rooted in the for-
120. Id. at 900-01. Patent agreements may alleviate litigation in the area of aircraft
design by creating allowances for shared technologies. See generally George
Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement, 31 J.L.
& ECON. 227 (1988).
121. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 899.
122. Id. at 899-900. Kalitta actually typed Rasmussen's STC number on the appropri-
ate line and used a photocopy of it on the certificate itself. Apparently the FAA has
no requirement of an original because it certified Kalitta's modified plane as airwor-
thy. Id. at 900.
123. Id. at 902-03. "The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons
to possess and use it to the exclusion of others . . . . [Tihe thing of which there
may be ownership is called property." Id. at 902 (quoting CAL. CiV. CODE § 654 (West
1982)). The court also refers to examples in California property law, including the
"composition of an author, the good-will of a business, trade-marks and signs,
and ... rights created by statute." Id. at 902 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 655 (West
1982)). The court further looked to pertinent case law. Id. See City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 843-44 (Cal. 1982) (finding a property right in a
professional football team); Golden v. State, 285 P.2d 49, 52-53 (Cal. 1955) (holding
that a state liquor license is property, though issued to one specific person and
transferrable to another); Roehm v. Orange County, 196 P.2d 550, 552 (Cal. 1948)
(announcing that a license is a privilege between the licensor and licensee, but is a
property interest between the licensee and a third party because it has value and
may be sold); Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 187 P.2d 474, 487 (Cal.
1947) (finding a property right in a book title); Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada
Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 128 (Cal. 1929) (stating that property includes everything
one can own and transfer to another); Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light and
Power Co., 82 P. 562, 562 (Cal. 1905) (finding a property right in electricity).
124. Rasmussen, at 906-07.
125. See supra notes 79-94, 108-18 and accompanying text.
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mer." Indeed, there was no state deprivation to trigger constitutional
protections. Nonetheless, the result in Rasmussen granted a property
interest in a government regulatory privilege. "That the interest in ques-
tion is limited to obtaining a governmental privilege, and a federal one at
that, does nothing to diminish its status as a property interest for purpos-
es of state law.""'
Rasmussen tests the outer limits of an economic theory position that
favors the establishment of property right protections." Such a theory
would promote the view that Rasmussen's efforts, risk, and design need
protection in order to encourage the very sort of creativity that first led
him to make such a modification.1" If knowledge like Rasmussen's is
determined to be private property, the question becomes whether an
important advance is excessively restricted from the realm of public
knowledge, thereby reducing efficiency as well as retarding further ad-
vances in the same area by third parties?"n Further, does granting a
property interest in a right bestowed by government regulation expand
potential property categories beyond what is efficient to society? An
examination of arguments both in favor of and opposed to property right
expansion is necessary to make such determinations.
III. ECONoMIc THEORY AND PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTION
Historically, economists have thought highly of property right pro-
gression.3 ' Sir William Blackstone recognized in the eighteenth century
that incentive to devise conveniences or creations improving life would
not be present if the creator could not subsequently enjoy the benefits of
ownership."n Beyond individual incentives of private ownership, soci-
126. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 902.
127. Id.
128. See infra notes 131-59 and accompanying text.
129. G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
130. See infra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; for a thorough examination of
economic issues pervasive in property law, see generally, BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, EcO-
NOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975).
132. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4. Additionally, St. Thomas Aquinas
wrote that private property is necessary in three respects: every person is more
careful to procure for him or herself alone than for others, human affairs are con-
ducted in a more orderly manner if each person has his or her own duties, and
finally a more peaceful state is assured if each person is contented with his or her
own. R. ScHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 35 (1951) (quoting
etal benefits are thought to include more efficient resource allocation"a
and prevention of the overuse of public goods."3
A. Efficiency Maximization Through Property Rights
A majority of economic theorists adhere to the general principle favor-
ing property right protections.35 Judge Posner best states the classic
economic position, writing that there are three criteria in an efficient sys-
tem of property rights: universality, exclusivity, and transferability."
Universality refers to the belief that all resources, except those so plenti-
ful that consumption is unlimited, should be owned or be capable of
being owned by someone.137 Exclusivity ensures that the owner, rather
than a third party, will reap the benefits of her property.'38
Transferability provides property's highest value through voluntary ex-
change."
However, because a perfectly efficient system is not attainable, limita-
tions to these principles have been adopted. Such limitations include
eminent domain powers," incompatible uses, 4' and limited duration
rights present in patent and copyright law. '4
2
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-lI, Q. 105, Art.2, BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS).
133. Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern Proper-
ty Rights Evolve, 1986 U. ILL L REv. 361, 385 (1986).
134. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968), reprinted in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 131, at 2
(1975).
135. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972); Hardin, supra note
134; George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCL
3, 4 (1971), reprinted in GEORGE STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON
REGULATION 114, 116 (1975) (government regulation creates rights that are actually
acquired and owned by the regulated industry thus increasing that industry's profit
potential). See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
136. POSNER, supra note 14, at 11-13.
137. Id. at 11-12.
138. Id. at 12-13.
139. Id. at 13.
140. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
141. The incompatible uses limitation can severely impact the exclusivity criteria.
For example, consider factory smoke creating harmful effects on neighboring proper-
ty. This situation limits the neighboring property owner's ability to exclude, yet may
be allowed with damage compensation, taxes, or other means whereby the factory
owner compensates the neighboring property owner. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960). Professor Come advocates that harmful
effects resulting from the use of one's property are factors of production, which
should be considered rights. Id. at 44. Such costs of operation are necessary in
various social arrangements, and changes in the social arrangement may produce
more harm than the original effect. Id. at 43.
142. See supra note 58.
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Transaction costs are likely the greatest limitation to efficiency. Such
costs include those expenses associated with transfer and distribution of
goods, particularly when the parties or strategies associated with monop-
oly rights are numerous. Transaction costs may also result from pollution
or even "competition among firms for the rents associated with innova-
tive devices and ideas." Where such costs are high, complete rights to
exclusion are likely to increase inefficiency.' Despite these market lim-
itations, economists believe that property protections are essential in
placing interests in proper hands while encouraging the creation of new
interests. 5
B. Adverse Effects of Failure to Recognize Property Rights
Economic theorists favoring the establishment of property rights bol-
ster their position by relying on models which demonstrate the harmful
effects caused by the failure to recognize and protect the changing
wealth and value in society. 4' The recognition of these models is par-
ticularly important in the realm of innovation, where costs such as
failure risk4 ' and potential liability4 are justified only by the subse-
143. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L. &
ECON. 177 (1990). Transaction costs are a widely recognized impediment to efficiency.
See Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 836 F.2d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that in determining whether a party's actions were intended to generate a
profit, a significant factor considered is the extent of the transaction costs). The
costs of litigation that Rasmussen incurred to gain protection for his STC is another
example of such transaction costs. See generally Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 737,
reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986).
144. POSNER, supra note 14, at 25. If a factory owner has an absolute right to
exclusion and transaction costs are prohibitive, the factory owner has no incentive to
reduce its pollution even though the cost of closing the factory may be less than the
damage to the neighboring property owner. Id. For further transaction cost analysis,
see Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Contracting, 82 Q.J. EcON. 33 (1968); George J.
Stigler, Two Notes on the Coase Theorem, 99 YALE L.J. 631 (1989); Oliver E. William-
son, Note, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
145. POSNER, supra note 14, at 32.
146. See infra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
147. The risk of failure involves expenses incurred in a failed design.
148. If a new design fails to perform as expected, the creator may be liable for
consequential damages. For example, if one of Rasmussen's planes had crashed he
"could be held liable for huge damage awards." G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs, v. Kalitta
Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Elsworth v. Beech Air-
craft Corp., 691 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993)). See gener-
ally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
quent benefit of private ownership. 45 The very basis of the intellectual
property system-individual creativity-is undermined if parties who did
not incur the costs of innovation are able to profit from it.
1. The "Free Rider" Problem
The "Free Rider" problem is specific to the creation of new goods."w
Free riders utilize technology created by others for their own economic
benefit "without having invested the time, money and effort of creating
it."'5' Thus, free riders create disincentives for the development of new
goods.'" A primary impetus of the intellectual property system is to
avoid free riders.' Creation of the intellectual property system, howev-
er, does not necessarily eliminate the free rider problem. Economic theo-
ry advocates that if the intellectual property system cannot expand to ac-
commodate different types of interests such as the regulatory privilege
afforded to Rasmussen's design, then the free rider problem is not avoid-
ed and innovation is, therefore, discouraged."N
2. The "Tragedy of the Commons"
The "Tragedy of the Commons" occurs when a property interest is
open to the "commons," or any potential user." As each user seeks to
maximize his own gain, the property's limits are surpassed and waste
results." One individual alone may not be the sole cause of the decline
in common resources. Rather, numerous parties' utilization of the re-
149. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 900.
150. Id. See generally, Donald 1. Baker & Richard S. Sayler, U.S. Justice Depart-
ment Patent-Antitrust Policy: The Hazards of Changing Policies and Distant Hori-
zons (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 339, 1992)
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REV.
347, 359 (1967).
154. See supra notes 13145 and accompanying text. Some restrictions on patents,
however, are justified. If two companies are working independently to develop a new
type of product, and one company finishes a month before the other, that company
may obtain a patent and render the other's work useless. This unjust result supports
some limitations on the duration of patents. POSNER, supra note 14, at 32-33. This is
an area where courts must be careful to distinguish between a free rider and an
actual innovator for purposes of state property protections.
155. The model and title of this phenomena are found in Hardin, supra note 134,
reprinted at 2. Professor Hardin's example of the tragedy of the commons is an open
pasture upon which any herdsman may allow their cattle to graze. Id. at 4. As the
number of cattle increases, the pasture decreases, leading to ruin. Id.
156. Id. at 4.
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source to the maximum extent possible leads to the deterioration.
57
Ironically, had these individuals been able to agree collectively on a dif-
ferent manner of allocation, they all would have been in a better posi-
tion."
Although the tragedy of the commons model is more commonly ap-
plied to better-established resources, its validity in the area of innovation
and creation is readily apparent. If the product of an innovator's work
merely becomes part of the commons, usable by any interested party,
waste results because successful entrepreneurs will be less likely to in-
vest the energy, time, and money in the given field."s Thus, the range of
the commons is broad, encompassing not only land and environment, but
also ideas and knowledge. Furthermore, wasting the commons may re-
sult not only from over-utilization of an existing resource, but also from
diminishing the likelihood of a future resource in the realm of intellectu-
al property.
C. Regulatory Interests and Economic Analysis
Activities and interests are increasingly becoming subject to expanding
regulatory control."6 This expansion results in governmentally bestowed
licenses, privileges, and benefits. Pursuant to the economic model of
property right expansion, as these regulatory schemes become more
157. John A. Chiappinelli, Note, The Right to a Clean and Sqfe Environment: A
Case for a Constitutional Amendment Recognizing Public Rights in Common Re-
sources, 40 BuFF. L. REV. 567, 579 (1992). Global environmental problems are often
the subject of "tragedy of the commons" analysis. See also Robert E. Cattanach, Jr.
& Peter V. O'Connor, Environmental Concerns Raised by the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 18 WM. MITCHELL L REV. 461, 476 (1992) (comparing the acid
rain problem to the "Tragedy of the Commons").
158. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378
n.19, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (granting the Environmental Protection Agency flexibility
in the structuring of pollution permits).
159. G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
160. See generally Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 3 (1971). Regulation may occur on a federal or
municipal level. Supervision of taxi franchising is a common example of municipal
regulation, as well as a common source of litigation. See Mark A. Perry, Note, Mu-
nicipal Supervision and State Action Antitrust Immunity, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1413,
1425 & n.64 (1990).
prevalent and affect interests of greater value to the owner, property
protections should be granted.'8 I
It is a process of evolution by which rights bestowed by government
regulation become privatized. In order for these rights to become privat-
ized, governmental supervision of a given market must first occur. Gov-
ernmental regulation occurs in numerous forms, such as regulation to
clear the channels of use when demands for a resource grow large
enough to congest the market." Governmental regulation may also re-
sult from the need for government intervention to monitor the safety of
an area, such as the aircraft design in Rasmussen. Regulation generally
involves instituting a system of permits to users.' These permits are
inherently valuable in that they allow a market participant to engage in
particular activities. If the regulatory process reaches a point where re-
strictions cease and rights of alienability are achieved, the process of
privatization is complete.'"
Government has four possible responses when it realizes that private
rights to government actions are developing: eliminate the right, regulate
transfer and sale, allow privatization but maintain the right to terminate
the rights of users, or simply transfer the rights to private possessors as
private property.'" Although property rights in regulatory interests have
yet to be discussed as often as intellectual property or government bene-
fits, advantages to granting property protections pursuant to the fourth
option and economic theory are readily apparent.'" A market in which
transfer is frictionless ensures that the party who most highly values a
given piece of property will obtain it, which is advantageous to society
since that party will likely use it in the most efficient manner."7 In addi-
tion, the right is usually obtained in a competition involving pay-
ments.'" These payments may involve effort and risk, as in Rasmussen,
161. See supra notes 13145 and accompanying text.
162. Nelson, supra note 133, at 374.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 374-75. A property right is thought to be alienable to the extent that a
transfer is permitted between a willing seller and buyer. Guido Calabresi & A. Doug-
las Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
165. Nelson, supra note 133, at 380.
166. Professors Calabresi and Melamed state that whether or not an entitlement
becomes private depends primarily on economic efficiency. This demands that we
choose the set of entitlements that leads to an allocation of resources that cannot be
improved upon. This occurs when "further change would not so improve the condi-
tion of those who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it
and still be better off than before." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 164, at 1093-94.
This is referred to as "Pareto-optimality." Id. at 1094.
167. Nelson, supra note 133, at 381.
168. POSNER, supra note 14, at 15. Whether payments are made directly to the
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that may diminish if property right protections are not available, which
would result in fewer and less spectacular innovations.
The Rasmussen court recognized Rasmussen's interest as "interesting
and peculiar."'" Yet the court also recognized that with the expansion
of the regulatory state, such an interest may become more prevalent and
not granting property protections may reinvigorate the age old problems
of free riders and commons destruction."°
IV. VIEWPOINTS OPPOSING PROPERTY EXPANSION
Arguments against property right expansion are numerous and attack
the classic economic theory from a variety of angles. The justification for
certain property being classified as inalienable, which essentially means
that ownership is restricted to the extent that property becomes part of a
broad public domain, is premised on diverse arguments ranging from the
idea that originality is an unascertainable legal fiction'" to the belief
that sometimes there is greater economic efficiency in the absence of
unencumbered private ownership.' 2 Furthermore, without additions to
the public domain, advancements of shared knowledge will not occur,
which, would result in limiting technological progression. 3 In addition,
withholding property right protection is thought to be necessary in areas
where the firm ideas of economic analysis do not fit, such as personal or
human flourishing. 4 An examination of these proposed limitations of
regulating agency, as is the case in rights to broadcast frequencies, or indirectly
through risk and effort, such costs will less likely be incurred if an unprotectable
interest results.
169. G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
170. Id. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
171. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990) (the
premise of copyright protection, where the author is credited with bringing something
new into the world, fails to consider the public domain of shared knowledge from
which a new author transforms and combines what is already public).
172. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and In-
herently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 719 (1986) (predictable instances of
market failure will be resolved more efficiently in the hands of government rather
than in the hands of numerous individual owners, which justifies a need for
governmentally controlled public property); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and
the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 938-41 (1985) (recognizing that
difficulties due to externalities, coordination, imperfections in information, and trans-
action costs may, in certain instances, justify market inalienability).
173. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 157.
174. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1937
property interests and alienability sheds light on the troubling question of
property in the expanded regulatory state.
A. The Public Domain
There are differing ways to view the public domain. Essentially, it is
the public ownership of property that is not privately owned by individu-
als or corporations or protected by intellectual property statutes.' 75 It
also is referred to as the "public's toll for conferring private property
rights in works of authorship."'76 A more positive characterization of
the public domain is the body of knowledge from which future innova-
tors or creators may draw and further enhance that which is already
available to society. The strongest arguments advocating inalienability
stem from this viewpoint.
77
There are several ways that the public may acquire assets. The "public
trust" theory states that the public has always had rights to the property
in question.' 78 This theory is customarily used in real property cases,
such as waterfront access."n In intellectual property cases, the public
domain may be regarded as having "trust" rights to undiscovered inter-
ests, which justifies public ownership at the time of discovery. According
to the "custom" theory the public acquires property because it asserts a
claim that is so old that there is no recollection of the ownership being
different.'" The "prescriptive" or dedicatory theory is available when "a
period of public usage gives rise to an implied grant or gift from private
owners."'' This theory may be appropriate with respect to intellectual
(1987) (market orientation and the economic arguments for its efficiency may at
times be out of touch with personal elements of the non-ideal world). Professor
Radin's concept of human flourishing includes personal circumstances as well as the
pursuit of social ideals. Id. at 1852.
175. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990). See generally, David Lange, Recog-
nizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 245 (1981).
176. Litman, supra note 171, at 967.
177. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 157. Property may be owned but still be inalien-
able to the extent that limitations on transferability or use exist. In the instant con-
text inalienability is complete as there is no individual ownership and, thus, no
property right protections.
178. Rose, supra note 172, at 714.
179. See State v. Superior Ct., 625 P.2d 239, 249 (Cal. 1981) (granting a public right
to inland waterfront property based on the public trust theory). See generally Jona-
than M. Hoff, Comment, Public Beach Access Exactions: Extending the Public Trust
Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1049 (1981).
180. Rose, supra note 172, at 714. This theory is also utilized in beach front prop-
erty cases. Customary public rights are also difficult to apply to intellectual property
because the very nature of intellectual property involves something new, rather than
something historic or traditional.
181. Id.
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creations: designs and innovations that are beneficial to and widely used
by society could ultimately become public domain.
The concept of public domain is inherent to all arguments favoring
diminished property protection."s Even if private protections to newly
created interests are not granted, these interests must still lie some-
where, thus the increases in the public domain. The only limit on the
extent of the public domain would be if government manages and regu-
lates these property interests."in
B. Inefficiencies in Economic Efficiency
The contention that withholding property right protections in certain
situations maximizes efficiency puts in question the very core of general
economic theory."8 Economic theory recognizes that a perfectly effi-
cient market system will never be attained because of the inherent costs
associated with production, exchange, and ownership."n Theories that
try to achieve perfect economic efficiency attack these flaws in the mar-
ket system and propose models that heighten resource production.
One theory that attempts to upgrade the market system's efficiency by
limiting alienability is based on the potential destruction wrought by
transaction costs." These costs may be numerous and unanticipated,
resulting from externalities, 7 problems in information, or coordina-
tion."s Where such costs are excessively high, inalienability rules would
182. See generally Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
183. An example of this is found in government regulation of broadcast frequencies.
POSNER, supra note 14, at 31. The law has not recognized property rights in broad-
casting at all. Id. Comprehensive federal regulation governs an industry that would
otherwise be wrought with property claims for rights to a particular frequency in a
given area. Id. at 33-34. Such a market would be highly inefficient and largely un-
manageable. Id. Regulation of the taxi industry in major cities is a similar example.
184. See supra notes 131-59 and accompanying text (discussing the economic theory
behind property right protection).
185. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (analyzing the relationship
between transaction costs and decreased efficiency).
186. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 172, at 937. See also supra notes 143-44 and
accompanying text.
187. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLum. L. REV. 970, 990
(1985). Externalities are costs derived from sources not actually a part of the ex-
change. These include loss of gains resulting from misconduct or administrative costs
resulting from external forces. Id. Justification for inalienability is found in the need
to control "external harm and the common pool." Id.
188. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 172, at 938.
require or forbid certain actions, rather than employ internal market
corrections of price incentives or market processes." These required
actions would minimize personal market incentives, thus providing maxi-
mized output to the market as a whole rather than to each interested
party.190
Markets also tend to work inefficiently where numerous parties desire
control over or access to an interest. These parties are often too many
and their interests too small to gain recognition in market transac-
tions.9' This is referred to as the "common pool" problem, where the
number of claimants and the extent of their interests are in indefinite
proportions." In this situation, government might manage the relative
relationships among the parties by regulating costs associated with gain-
ing an interest. Also, government may allocate a greater interest to a
more productive party." This is already seen in collective goods such
as the broadcast spectrum. 5 This reflects the notion that there will be
instances where the inefficiencies associated with disinterested manage-
ment are less numerous than those associated with high transaction
costs.
C. Advancing the Public Domain
When interests lie within the public domain, other parties may use,
modify, and improve them. This use occurs without the burden of
compensating the original creator. One model that advocates limiting
property right protections and promotes advancement of an enlarged
public domain contends that excessive protections quell further advance-
ment on current innovation." Granting overly broad monopoly rights to
previous innovators deters such improvement and retards the creation of
189. Id. External corrections are limitations on transferability to or by particular
parties. For example, a law may require owners to live on the land and develop it in
order to perfect title. Id. at 940. Conversely, persons close to bankruptcy may be
prevented from giving away particular assets. Id.
190. Id. at 938.
191. Rose, supra note 172, at 719.
192. Epstein, supra note 187, at 978. Professor Epstein notes that strangers may
create common pool problems by acting pursuant to custom or law. He also stated
that individuals may create problems by acting pursuant to a consensual agreement.
Id. at 979. A fitting example is the allocation of water rights where numerous parties
on a given body of water assert individual interests in water use. Id.
193. Rose, supra note 172, at 719. Rose emphasized that government might be the
best manager of resources when individual parties have competing interests. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. See also POSNER, supra note 14, at 31.
196. Litman, supra note 182, at 965.
197. Gordon, supra note 2, at 157.
[Vol. 21: 127, 1993] Property Right Protection
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
new intellectual products." The result is a diminished realm of new
technology and a society unable to respond flexibly to new opportunity
or danger."'
Unjust enrichment theories, such as misappropriation, are a primary
basis for protecting initial innovations. However, by limiting the public
domain and consequently advances from it, these theories have the result
of chilling creativity more than protecting it.' The proposed solution to
this dilemma lies in limiting the judge made protections for intellectual
property and relying on federal protections." This will result in more
uniformity, and check the rapid expansion of state intellectual property
protections.
D. Debunking Creativity
Intellectual protections credit an author with bringing something en-
tirely "new into the world."' These protections are limited to that as-
pect of the author's work that is actually new, with the rest falling into
the public domain.' Original intellectual property is a product of the
creator's memories, experiences, inspirations, and influences. Copy-
right protections attempt a near impossible task: determining what is
original from the vast array of public knowledge and protecting only the
new creation.
Currently, courts entertain an analysis of originality only when the
party requesting protection recognizes use of a pre-existing work.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 277-78.
201. Id. Professor Gordon contends that copyright, patent, and trademark laws likely
provide adequate incentives to ensure the protection and growth of the intellectual
property industry. Id. See supra note 57.
202. Litman, supra note 171, at 967.
203. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 215 (1990) (stating that renewal rights in a.
copyrighted work are still present to successors after the death of the author);
Litman, supra note 171, at 968.
204. -Litman, supra note 171, at 1007-08.
205. Id. at 974-75. Professor Litman deals exclusively with copyright protections in
her article, generally referring to authorship of written works. However, this theory is
not limited to this analysis, as illustrated in Rasmussen. In obtaining his STC,
Rasmussen drew on his general knowledge of aircraft, a portion of which was in the
public domain.
206. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 234-35. The Court pointed out that "[c]ompilations or
abridgments, adaptions, arrangements, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of
Rather than grant such protections, which at best will apply in a hit and
miss manner, this approach argues that society should recognize that
these works bolster the public domain, without which new works would
not exist. 7 Accordingly, creativity becomes mere translation and re-
combination of a commons into which ages of ideas and innovations
have gone.'
E. Human Flourishing and Cultural Property
One could argue that a shortcoming of economic analysis is its cold
reliance on efficiency and its failure to consider human or cultural con-
cerns. The "human flourishing" view argues that economic analysis is
morally wrong when it is set forth as the "sole discourse of human
life." '° Universal commodification contemplates a world market that is
all-encompassing;2 ° one that is unable to coexist with crucial but ab-
stract concepts like freedom 'and identity. " ' Economic analysis conse-
quently undermines these personal attributes by conceiving of rela-
tionships and philosophical and moral commitments as quantifiable and
alienable."2 Consequently, alienability is justified to the extent that
these abstract ideas are assimilated into the market.2 3
Similar to the theory of human flourishing is the idea that grouphood
expresses something about an entire group's relationship to certain prop-
erty.2"" Cultural property, such as historical objects or some kinds of
works" in the public domain are granted copyright protection only of the duration
and scope of the already existing protected portion. Id. See also Gracen v. Bradford
Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding plaintiffs work insufficiently original to
meet copyright requirements).
207. See Litman, supra note 171, at 1023.
208. Id. at 966.
209. Radin, supra note 174, at 1851. For Professor Radin's introduction of this
concept, see Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982) [hereinafter Property and Personhoodl.
210. Radin, supra note 174, at 1859. See also Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Econom-
ics, and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, EcONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV 3 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (arguing that it is impossible for
everything of value to be owned and/or sold).
211. Radin, supra note 174, at 1903.
212. Id. at 1905. Examples of this are prostitution, surrogacy, and the sale of ba-
bies. See also Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?,
34 U. TORONTO L. J. 341 (1984). The clash between commodification and personhood
occurs when property becomes so closely bound up with our individual identities that
its loss "causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object's replacement." Property
and Personhood, supra note 209, at 959.
213. Radin, supra note 174, at 1937.
214. John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalien-
ability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1184 (1989). See generally Joseph L Sax, Is Any-
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art, can be vital to the preservation and advancement of group identity
and self-esteem.21" ' The cultural -property approach differentiates be-
tween fungible goods and property, and advocates that raw economic
analysis not apply to such "group" interests."
F. Regulatory Interests and Alienability Limitations
Arguments favoring a limitation on the expansion of property right
protections reject the overly broad economic model that favors creation
of property right protections to almost any interest that can be
owned.217 While these arguments are valid in some instances, such as
imposing efficiency limitations in an unregulated broadcasting market,21
their worth as a replacement for the general economic position is slight.
Supporters advocating inalienability based on human and cultural
property propose areas where economic analysis is inappropriate."'
Prostitution, baby sale, and some art and historical objects may fall
within such "public" or "individual" interests.'s However, the existence
of valid exceptions does not justify replacing the economic model be-
cause these areas reflect only a small percentage of the changing inter-
ests in society." Similarly, the argument that creativity is a legal fic-
tion222 may be applicable in some areas of written work, but should not
prevent protection of technological advance, even if recombined prior
one Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural Property Protection in England,
78 CAL.. L. REV. 1543, 1554-56 (1990) (exploring the origins of English cultural proper-
ty law and society's collective historical interest).
215. Moustakas, supra note 214, at 1185.
216. Id.
217. See Radin, supra note 174, at 1851; Rose, supra note 172, at 715-16; Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 172, at 932.
218. See supra note 183. For a critical analysis of theories directly conflicting with
the economic model, see infra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
219. See Moustakas, supra note 214, at 1186; Radin, supra note 174, at 1905. See
also supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
220. Radin, supra note 174, at 1852.
221. In Professor Radin's model of human flourishing, supra notes 209-13 and
accompanying text, inalienability is pursued as a "method of correcting market fail-
ures," rather than a replacement to the market. Radin, supra note 174, at 1851. Most
.new" property interests are a result of the replacement of industrial and manufactur-
ing sectors with high tech information industries. Gordon, supra note 2, at 156. This
has resulted in the United States being the world's largest exporter of copyrighted
works. Id. at 156-57 and n.25 (quoting MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPY-
RIGHT LAW § 12.5 (1989)).
222. Se supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
technologies are the source. Where there is the capacity to do something
that was not present before, something new exists.'
In a regulatory context, the issue is whether governmentally created
interests fall into one of the areas where alienability may properly be
limited or whether the general economic approach is appropriate. To
make this determination, one must explore the underlying arguments.
V. ISSUE RESOLUTION AND A PROPOSED MODEL
Economic theory and justifiable inalienability are generally viewed as
diametrically opposed. How could models proposing ownership for all
but the most plentiful of goods coexist with models advocating govern-
ment control of a market or the growth of the public domain? Certainly
there are distinct differences between these theories in both analysis of
interests and allocation of protections. 4 These theories, however, do
not have differing ideals; both strive to procure what is best from a soci-
etal standpoint. Thus, particularized models may be formulated in a given
area of potential property right protection that can answer to theories on
either side of the economic barrier. It is within the Rasmussen con-
text-intellectual property and regulatory privilege-that this task is
undertaken.
A. Is the Expansion of Property Right Protections an Economically
Necessary Supplement to Newly Created Interests?
This Comment concludes that society should afford property right
protection to regulatory interests stemming from intellectual design."
As regulation of economic markets increases, property right questions re-
garding resulting interests increase."6 Despite necessary intervention in
areas ranging from telecommunications and broadcasting to public health
and safety, dire consequences may result if government supervision cur-
sorily undermines a free enterprise market. 7 Technological progression
223. See infra notes 24043 and accompanying text (proposing a model to measure
intellectual property protection).
224. See supra notes 131-223 and accompanying text.
225. Rasmussen's airplane modification has value and use only pursuant to a reg-
ulatory scheme. G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896,
900-01 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993). The creativity and innovation
necessary to such design should receive protection.
226. See generally EARNEST GELLHORN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., REGULATED INDUS-
TRIES IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1987); Louis B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION (6th ed. 1985) (examining govern-
ment regulation of industry and the market system).
227. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure As Cata-
lysts for Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect
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depends on individual creation and innovation." Limitations on proper-
ty rights will not diminish the sources of creativity, but will raise the cost
of innovation to a prohibitive level. To ensure continued technological
advance, society must establish a method of compensation for risks tak-
en, costs or losses incurred, and potential litigation costs.2
The hybrid combination of intellectual creation and government regula-
tion must receive property right protection. If not, there will be little to
convert and less to regulate. Where the impetus to create becomes vul-
nerable due to regulation or public ownership, technological progression
mandates following the economic model to the extent it provides incen-
tive through protection of intellectual creation. This rationale does not
diminish when innovation acquires the stamp of regulation.'
Once property right protection is granted, additional issues arise. The
duration of the protection is of particular importance. With regard to this
issue, theories limiting property right protections become relevant and
helpful. Where compelling reasons for bolstering the public domain exist,
a permanent monopoly for the creator may not be feasible. The duration
of the protection will vary according to the relevant factors unique to the
interest. The issue of whether the courts or the legislature should deter-
mine protections and duration also arises. While lawmakers have the
right to govern such protections, application becomes difficult because of
the varying interests emerging in society. Courts are in a better position
to evaluate interests as they evolve and, thus, should have some latitude
in making property right protection determinations. The most difficult
aspect of newly created interests is that they do not fall neatly in a par-
ticular area, and instead must be considered individually, in terms of
whether they warrant protection and for what duration.
Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE. L REV. 1, 23-25 (1989) (advocating public policy
considerations instead of heavy-handed regulation in finding a middle ground between
excessive government direction and competitive capitalism).
228. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 900.
229. Id. This idea occupies an essential place in economic theory. See supra notes
135-59 and accompanying text.
230. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 900. A product of intellectual creation, these interests
need protection in order to ensure future creativity.
B. Are Limitations to Property Right Protections or Alienability
Necessary to Achieve Maximum Resource Allocation Efficiency
or to Ensure that Property Rights Co-exist With Other
Societal Interests?
The best argument in rebuttal to the conclusion that property right
protection should apply to regulatory interests stemming from intellectu-
al design is that further advancement of innovation will not occur if the
initial work is protected. 1 Although implications for future develop-
ment are certainly present, this becomes a question of which work came
first. Incentive to advance technology is worthless if the initial innova-
tions are never created. Therefore, mechanisms must ensure the exis-
tence of initial innovations before consideration of further development.
Once this occurs, protections of future designers that do not directly
encroach the rights associated with the initial design may be consid-
ered. 2
Proposals that address the inefficiencies inherent in free markets, and
suggest correction through governmentally required actions or inactions,
foretell trouble. In all likelihood these proposals will create more ineffi-
ciencies than they eliminate.' Of course, regulation remains unavoid-
able in certain areas, such as the broadcast area.' But rather than re-
sulting in maximized efficiency, as its proponents suggest,' limiting
alienability through government control results in new interests. Subse-
quently acquired by the regulated industry, these new interests give rise
to entirely new property right issues.' Rasmussen clearly presents this
fact.237
231. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 157.
232. For example, utilization of protected technology for the purpose of advance-
ment, as opposed to the direct conversion present in Rasmussen, may provide an
allowable enterprise. Should there be a significant advancement undermining the value
of the initial creation, a system of comparative apportionment should be implemented
with deference to the initial creator. Such deference results from greater value to
society which the initial innovator provides; without the initial creator, the second
creator does not exist.
233. For example, if restricting transferability because of excessive transaction costs,
the means by which property arrives in the hands of the party that will best utilize it
vanishes. Monitored leaseholds could provide a temporary solution. POSNER, supra
note 14, at 13 n.8. However, this creates more efficiency limitations through nec-
essary compliance with the leasehold scheme and termination and renewal transaction
costs.
234. Id. at 13.
235. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
236. Stigler, supra note 135, at 4. Whether creating a property right or not, regula-
tion involves permits and privileges distributed to and acquired by the participants in
the regulated area
237. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
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Although economic theory provides the best model by which decisions
regarding the increasing number of government interests are made, theo-
ries advocating withholding property right protections point out appropri-
ate trouble spots and aid in their resolution.' In certain instances of
inevitable regulation, these theories make the market better able to uti-
lize gains in efficiency and minimize loss.' In addition, concerns re-
garding the advancement of protected innovation aid in creating provi-
sions protecting third-party creativity, yet minimizing losses of the origi-
nal creator. Finally, they may aid in determining the duration of the pro-
tection.
C. Proposed Model Protecting Innovation-Based Regulatory Privilege
Interests utilizing regulatory privilege as well as products of intellectu-
al creation embody unique legal entities, involving state intellectual prop-
erty law, federal statutes, and government regulation. Compelling argu-
ments exist for protecting such interests beyond federal provisions,2'
yet courts must be careful to ensure that overbroad criteria for
protections are not implemented and that only actual innovation is re-
warded. A two-pronged analysis should be implemented. First, property
right protection should be provided only upon showing measurable sci-
entific or technological advances resulting directly from the design or in-
novation. Second, the standard measuring such an advance should ask
whether society now has the capacity to do something that it could not
have done prior to the innovation.24 In other words, an independently
created right to government regulation does not exist. When granting
such regulation pursuant to an individually .created societal or techno-
238. See supra note 217-23 and accompanying text.
239. Necessary regulation of the broadcast spectrum and taxi use typify this reason-
ing. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
240. The Rasmussen court decided against private enforcement of federal protec-
tion, thus requiring the utilization of state law. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
discussed at supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text, determining whether a private
action exists pursuant to a federal statute requires examining furtherance or hin-
drance of congressional objectives. Id. at 78. This may be a difficult standard when
applied to regulation. G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Sew., Inc., 958 F.2d
896, 902 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
241. The burden here rests on the party claiming protection, which is a logical al-
location based on the familiarity the party will have with the technological area and
their ability to best enlighten the court. Once meeting this burden, along with indi-
vidual state requirements regarding property rights, there arises a rebuttable presump-
tion of a new technological benefit.
logical advance, however, property right protections go with the innova-
tion, even if it enters the increasing sphere of government regulation.
The property rights obtained are not rights to receive such a privilege
from the government, but rather to protect such a privilege from conver-
sion after receipt.
Pursuant to this Comment's model, the Ninth Circuit reached the cor-
rect conclusion in Rasmussen.242 By showing that plans modified pursu-
ant to his design additions could carry more weight than originally
thought, Rasmussen demonstrated that society can now do something it
previously could not.' Thus, a measurable technological advance exist-
ed which warranted protection pursuant to state intellectual property
law.
This model does not intend to replace state provisions for intellectual
property protection. It does propose a workable standard for dealing
with intellectual property falling within a regulatory scheme. Equally im-
portant, however, this Comment attempts to illustrate the increasing
complexity that interests will exhibit as technical advances comprise a
growing percentage of societal interest and value. Each potential interest
will exhibit its own individual characteristics. Solutions will necessarily
entail consideration of economic theory as well as proposals limiting
property right protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
Property right protection of regulatory privilege based on intellectual
creation embodies the economic solution to competing forces: the indi-
vidual goal to create -and obtain interests and their rents, and
government's regulation of particular markets. As society witnesses the
continuing evolution of economic resources and commodities, the ten-
sion between these forces builds. Failure to grant property right protec-
tion to resources that reflect individual creation or design will, in all
practicality, facilitate conversion.' This results in a deteriorated level
242. The Rasmussen court based its decision on the determination that Rasmussen's
government privilege was capable of precise definition, exclusive possession or con-
trol, and that Rasmussen had a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d
at 903. This is not inconsistent with this Comment's model, which proposes to aid in
determining whether a claimant has a legitimate claim to exclusivity.
243. Id. at 899. Based on "hundreds of hours of engineering work," Rasmussen
showed that with the addition of three instrument gauges and an additional flight
manual, DC-8 airplanes could carry more cargo weight than previously thought. Id.
See also supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. See also WILLIAM KINGSTON,
DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1-34 (William Kingston ed,, 1987) (proposing prop-
erty rights vest only upon introduction of a new product on the market).
244. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
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of technological achievement.
Each regulated industry produces a unique interest, thereby precluding
a bright line test to govern decisions regarding property right protections.
However, examining arguments both for and against individual owner-
ship helps resolve each scenario's difficulties. 5 Intellectual property
interests which fall within the purview of government regulation must be
protected to secure efforts at future technology in similarly regulated
areas. Thus, it becomes essential to afford protection to interests that
reflect direct scientific or technological advance. 6 Property right pro-
tection may not provide the solution to every regulatory scenario. For
Rasmussen and similar creators, however, property right protection is a
necessary resolution to an issue that is becoming increasingly prevalent
as the regulatory state expands.
J. MILES HANISEE
245. See supra notes 131-223 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.

